

# When an Immovable Object Meets an Irresistible Force

## Military Popularity and Affective Partisanship

*Jonathan D. Caverley*

The United States military may not be interested in political polarization, but political polarization is very interested in the United States military. Partisan gridlock channeled through the 2001 Budget Control Act has prevented the Pentagon from stable budgets for a decade. Active and retired generals have served in political positions at unprecedented numbers. The President has over-ruled the military justice system in highly visible and unusual ways. And during the nationwide response to the killing of George Floyd by police, military leaders have been thrust into the forefront of a crisis one newspaper called the military's "worst schism with the American public since the fractious Vietnam War years."<sup>1</sup> The president clearly has played an important role in initiating many of these crises, leading to unprecedented pushback, perhaps most prominently from retired Marine general and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, "Donald Trump is the first president in my lifetime who does not try to unite the American people—does not even pretend to try. Instead he tries to divide us. We are witnessing the consequences of three years of this deliberate effort."<sup>2</sup> But while the military make take some comfort that many of these pressures come from one individual actor, it must understand that the ultimate source may not be the current president.

Contemporary US politics has thrown much of social science's conventional wisdom into confusion.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, most analysts remain confident about two enduring aspects of the country's political environment. The first fact is that the United States military consistently ranks as the most popular institution in the country by wide margins. Indeed, its popularity is remarkably impervious to decline, despite the disappointing outcomes of its several recent wars.<sup>4</sup> The second fact is that the number of citizens identifying as supporters of one party and exhibiting contempt for supporters of the other continues to

climb. Research suggests that discrimination against opposing partisans now outstrips that based on race.<sup>5</sup> Partisanship overwhelms other social forces, to the point that some claim it now determines one's brand of athletic shoes or the willingness to be vaccinated for COVID-19.<sup>6</sup> What happens when the immovable object of "the troops'" popularity meets the irresistible force of partisan polarization?

For understandable reasons, members of the military cheer their popularity (loudly, with taxpayer money, and often at sporting events) while quietly lamenting partisan polarization. Indeed, many argue that the nonpartisan nature of the professional military is the very *reason* for its popularity. In synthesizing much recent work, this chapter takes a broader look at both social facts and places them in the context of a larger, global military popularity and rising populist nationalism. It then speculates on what this might entail for US politics and foreign policy in the future.

## The Immovable Object

Few works of research on US civil-military relations and fewer members of the military fail to note that the military has steadily increased in terms of public confidence from the 1970s through the present.<sup>7</sup> Burbach quite reasonably points out the puzzle of the military's high popularity given its inability to win wars.<sup>8</sup> This section argues that the military remains popular because its relative ineffectiveness is precisely the type of force that average voters, and the military itself, demand. But this also means that due to an increasingly tenuous connection to its military, the typical voter (and politician) will treat the military like any other issue or institution.

It is commonly accepted that the US public's attitude to the military and, perhaps more important, war is due to the fact that the average voter does not have much skin in the game. The capital-intensive military built and employed by the United States clearly substitutes capital for labor, as does its lack of conscription.<sup>9</sup> For the United States and other wealthy democracies, war has become an exercise in fiscal rather than social mobilization. And the average voters in the United States, aided by their representatives, are quite adept at shifting these monetary costs away from themselves. The US federal tax system, which lavishly funds the military, is one of the most progressive in the world.<sup>10</sup> When taxes are shifted to the median voter, war becomes less popular.<sup>11</sup> Caverley makes the case that, due to a combination of capital-intensive technology and economic inequality, democracies will build larger militaries, use them more promiscuously, and see worse results, particularly

in the more labor-intensive counterinsurgencies in which the United States remains embroiled.<sup>12</sup>

Along with the average voter, the military as an institution supports such a capital-intensive force. It should not surprise anyone that soldiers who pay the highest price in a war want to be protected with the best equipment money can buy. Historically the military has liked technological solutions to its warfighting problems.<sup>13</sup> The shift toward great power competition noted in the latest National Security Strategy is likely to require a lot more capital than labor.<sup>14</sup> The large US defense budgets, which covered a billion dollars for advertising and public relations contracts from 2006 to 2015, may themselves be a causal force behind this popularity.<sup>15</sup>

Secular trends in technology will make this equilibrium stickier. Both economic inequality and capital intensiveness are likely caused in part by the long-term social and economic processes of labor becoming more productive and the gains from technology becoming more unevenly distributed. Golby, Cohn, and Feaver argue that the high regard for the military is based on the fact that few serve even as the military is used often, leading to the frequent anecdote of veterans being “thanked for their service.”<sup>16</sup> Given current trends, it is likely there will be plenty of service in the future, no doubt prompting still more gratitude.

## The Irresistible Force

The good news from a civil-military relations perspective is that, despite identifying heavily as Republicans (even after controlling for demographic factors and especially among the officer corps), the active-duty military is relatively nonpartisan in its behavior and even its private opinions.<sup>17</sup> The bad news is that the military’s masters are extremely partisan. In addition to highlighting this divide and placing the military’s popularity into context by comparing it to opinion about other national institutions, I discuss the concept of “affective polarization” and what it might mean for militarized politics in the future.

Dempsey found that soldiers’ social and political attitudes track fairly closely with the views of the civilian population. However, officers appear to be less partisan and activist than the average civilian.<sup>18</sup> On certain issues, service members are in fact decidedly more liberal than the general population. In 2004, civilians were substantially more likely than Army personnel to oppose abortion under all circumstances, and large majorities of Army personnel supported increasing domestic government spending on education, healthcare, Social Security, and environmental protection.<sup>19</sup> Military officers also support civil liberties and more stringent gun control at higher rates than the general American public.<sup>20</sup>

This is somewhat ironic, as Owens points out: “liberals” see the values of the military as being less progressive than those of the society at large.<sup>21</sup> Conservative civilian respondents tend to believe that people join the military for patriotic reasons, whereas liberals ascribe it to economic motives.<sup>22</sup> The way partisanship works in the United States, this may be the most important finding from public opinion data. The importance of the military’s nonpartisanship is akin to the famous response of the North Vietnamese colonel to the US military’s claim it never lost in battle: while true, it is largely irrelevant.<sup>23</sup>

How civilians feel about the military, despite the high approval on the surface, is largely driven by party identification. Golby shows that most differences in civil-military attitudes largely disappear after conditioning on partisan identification.<sup>24</sup> Liebert and Golby show that in the late 1970s, Democrats had greater confidence in the military than did Republicans.<sup>25</sup> However, over time, Republican confidence has outstripped that of Democrats. Burbach notes that party identification is now the best predictor in the venerable General Social Survey (GSS) of respondent confidence in the military.<sup>26</sup> Figure 9.1 replicates previous findings by showing the growing difference in the percentage of GSS




Figure 9.1 Difference in percentage of Democrat and Republican GSS respondents having a “great deal of confidence” in the military, 1973–2018

respondents who answer that they have a great deal of confidence in the military.<sup>27</sup> Burbach further finds that the partisan gap is more pronounced among strong party identifiers than among weak ones.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, essentially all of the growth in the percentage of Americans with great confidence in the military is due to the increased confidence of Republican identifiers after 9/11.

Beyond “confidence,” partisanship shapes views on many aspects of politics related to the military. The partisan divide has also never been greater on the question: “How effective do you think military superiority is to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States?” To this, 66% of Republicans responded “very effective,” while only 38% of Democrats agreed.<sup>29</sup> In a recent Pew survey, 83% of Democrats said good diplomacy (versus “military strength”) is the best way to ensure peace. Just 33% of Republicans said peace is best ensured with good diplomacy, among the lowest share since the question was first asked in 1994.<sup>30</sup> Gaines and colleagues show that partisanship (and the correlated media diet) shapes evaluations of battlefield performance, producing different assessments even when given the same objective information.<sup>31</sup> For two decades after the Cold War’s end, no partisan divide existed over whether Russia represents the “greatest danger” to the United States. Both parties’ adherents moved in lockstep with each other, with the biggest divide appearing in 2008 (Republicans 16%, Democrats 13%). The divide is now an unprecedented 18% (21% and 39% respectively).<sup>32</sup>

## Comparing the Divide across Other Issues

While Liebert and Golby contrast the increased partisanship of the military to decreased partisanship of the public, this is not supported by the data.<sup>33</sup> Across ten measures that Pew Research Center has tracked on the same surveys since 1994, the average partisan gap has increased from 15 percentage points to 36 points. The partisan gap is much larger than the differences between the opinions of Blacks and whites, men and women, and other groups in society.<sup>34</sup> Pew reports that “in recent years, the gaps on several sets of political values in particular—including measures of attitudes about the social safety net, race and immigration—have increased dramatically.”

How does polarization over the military compare to other issues? Table 9.1 compares the partisan gap on the military to that for other institutions, showing the absolute differences in percent of partisans having “great confidence” in 2018 for all of the institutions covered in the GSS.<sup>35</sup> There is a remarkable amount of variation. The military retains very high support in

**Table 9.1** Percentages of 2018 General Social Survey Respondents with a “Great Deal of Confidence” by Institution and Political Party

Institution	Republican	Democrat	Difference
Military	77.0	51.8	25.2
Executive branch	23.7	6.1	17.6
Supreme Court	42.5	25.5	17.0
Press	5.6	21.1	-15.5
Major companies	29.8	15.3	14.5
Scientific community	38.5	49.9	-11.4
Organized religion	26.9	17.9	9.0
Banks and financial institutions	25	17.0	8.0
Education	22.9	30.5	-7.6
Congress	8.3	5.2	3.1
Medicine	35.4	37.5	-2.1
Organized labor	13.0	13.3	-0.3

Results presented with largest absolute difference first. Differences with larger Republican percentages presented in parentheses.

Source: Tom W. Smith, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Stephen L. Morgan, *General Social Surveys, 1972–2018: Cumulative Codebook* [Data File and Codebook] (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, December 2019).

both parties relative to any other institution, but the difference between the parties is also by far the biggest, larger than the difference for such divisive institutions as the executive branch, organized religion, and “science.” Put another way, Democrats and Republicans agree less on the military than they do on banks, the press, the Supreme Court, and organized labor. Both sides are as one in their contempt for Congress, perhaps the most partisan of all institutions. Why is opinion on one of the least partisan institutions so divisive?

One possible reason is that unlike many other institutions, the military is associated with an issue—defense—perceived as “owned” by one party.<sup>36</sup> In this sense the military has more in common with “organized religion” or “major companies,” as traditional Republican issues/constituents. Partisans of both sides believe that the military is on the Republicans’ “side.”

Brooks points out that one of the most interesting findings from Dempsey is that self-selected political labels are extremely poor predictors of soldiers’ actual views on social, political, and economic issues.<sup>37</sup> This comports with broader findings about the public in American political science research. Neither the military nor the public seems too polarized when it comes to *ideological* polarization. The divide emerges instead from the rise in *affective* polarization.

## Rising Affective Polarization

American politics research identifies and measures several different types of polarization. There is little debate that, among politicians and other party “elites,” there is growing disagreement on policy issues.<sup>38</sup> It is less clear that the public disagrees as much on policy.<sup>39</sup> While scholars do not agree on the level of policy or ideological polarization, there exists a broad consensus that the mass public increasingly dislikes members of the other party.<sup>40</sup> That is, they have grown more *affectively* polarized in recent years. It is this element of public partisanship that this chapter highlights.

Affective polarization refers to the mutual dislike by both members of the parties, in which partisans impute negative traits to the other side, as well as positive traits to their own.<sup>41</sup> The level has grown so strong that partisans now believe that “other party’s members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines, or even to partner with opponents in a variety of other activities.”<sup>42</sup> This makes the belief by either set of partisans that the military sides with one team potentially quite toxic for healthy civil-military relations.

Burbach finds that confidence in the military among Republicans and among conservatives has consistently grown over time, regardless of who is president. One piece of particularly strong evidence supporting the affective polarization diagnosis is that Republican high school seniors are nearly twice as likely to join the military as Democrats.<sup>43</sup> Golby and colleagues present experimental data that largely support the theory that Republican respondents show a greater affinity for listening to messages coming from generals on military actions across a range of scenarios, regardless of whether the statement supports or opposes the action.<sup>44</sup>

This especially may be the case because members of the American public generally lack information about foreign affairs and the use of force, nor do they have settled opinions about these subjects. This makes them prone to laying their partisan affinities on top of the military and the policies the government asks it to execute. Regardless of what the military does or does not believe, civilian leaders and the public will make up their minds based on affiliative partisanship, because they believe (rightly) that the military is more Republican than Democratic.

## From Partisanship to Populism?

What can the military do in the face of this powerful riptide in American politics? Levendusky shows that when experimental subjects’ sense of Americans’

national identity is heightened, such as on July 4th or during the 2008 summer Olympics, they come to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans rather than as rival partisans.<sup>45</sup> The US military has taken great pains (and spent great amounts of money) to associate itself with the nation rather than with politics.

But it is hard to believe, in an era in which many basic norms of democracy seemed called into question around the world,<sup>46</sup> that politicians will be inclined to allow the military to remain immune to polarization. While Donald Trump has quite openly violated these norms,<sup>47</sup> he is not alone in using the military as a campaign tool. There is something uniquely powerful about the military and its intimate ties to security and the state.<sup>48</sup> Caverley and Krupnikov portrayed Barack Obama speaking before varying backgrounds—including soldiers, students, children, and “ordinary” people.<sup>49</sup> Only the image of soldiers had any significant effect, shifting participant preferences toward spending money on defense over education. The image has the largest hawkish effect on the president's copartisans. If political elites in the United States are effectively campaigning at all times, the public receives a continuous stream of partisan cues.<sup>50</sup> This self-reinforcing cycle is likely to ensnare the military regardless of what it does, because affective partisanship has little to do with the military's actions or announcements.

As if this were not enough, the military must also be aware of a separate but related political trend. I previously observed that both economic inequality and military capitalization, forces that shape how and when the public will support military spending and war, are related aspects of long-term social and economic processes that are operating worldwide. These same political-economic forces are also thought to shape the current rise of populist nationalism around the world.<sup>51</sup>

Mead links populism and militarism when he describes the 2016 US presidential election as the result of important social forces culminating in a rare “Jacksonian revolt.”<sup>52</sup> Jacksonians, while relatively isolationist in their outlook, believe in building a strong military that only fights in self-defense. He describes the belief system of voters motivated by this worldview:

For Jacksonian America, certain events galvanize intense interest and political engagement, however brief. One of these is war; when an enemy attacks, Jacksonians spring to the country's defense. The most powerful driver of Jacksonian political engagement in domestic politics, similarly, is the perception that Jacksonians are being attacked by internal enemies, such as an elite cabal or immigrants from different backgrounds. Jacksonians worry about the U.S. government being taken over by malevolent forces bent on transforming the United States' essential character.<sup>53</sup>



Recent research links support for Jacksonian populism with a sense in the electorate of a loss of status by one in-group relative to out-group members. This in-group is tied to categories such as social class, gender, rural versus urban residence, and education. Social science is only beginning to tease out the links for these forces.<sup>54</sup> Researchers must also consider their implications for civil-military relations.

This process is not limited to the United States. Rising populism is a global trend and should be considered in tandem with the role of the military in politics around the world. Importantly, the military occupies the same prestigious spot in the public trust across a broad swath of countries. Each of eight recently polled Western European democracies ranked the military as its most respected institution,<sup>55</sup> as did each of seven Arab states and each of seventeen Latin American countries (second only to the Catholic Church).<sup>56</sup> In Russia, trust in the military polls higher than even support for President Vladimir Putin.<sup>57</sup> Majorities in South Africa, India, and Indonesia responded that “rule by the military” would be a good way of governing the country.<sup>58</sup>

In more than one country, we can identify a confluence of forces encapsulated by Brazil’s “BBB caucus”—short for “bullet, beef and Bible”—representing the interests of security forces, agribusiness, and evangelical churches.<sup>59</sup> There are worrying signs that, again through little fault of the military itself, populism may color US civil-military relations in the near future. The military appears to be a success story in terms of racial integration relative to the rest of the United States.<sup>60</sup> This may be one reason the chiefs of each US armed service pushed back so strongly against the 2017 white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, in sharp contrast to the Trump administration’s tepid response.<sup>61</sup> But again, this may not matter if white Americans think that the military is “for” them. Burbach notes a growing gap in confidence in the military between whites and nonwhites.<sup>62</sup> One fascinating experiment designed to overcome social desirability bias showed a very large, twenty-five-point difference in support for spending on veterans’ benefits between whites and blacks.<sup>63</sup>

While the confluence of consistently high military popularity with increasingly high partisan polarization and populism in the United States may be unprecedented, in another sense it is yet another round of the classic civil-military relations debate between Huntington and Janowitz.<sup>64</sup> Whereas Huntington characterizes the military as both naturally conservative and yet able to stand apart from politics, Janowitz instead argues that the military cannot be separated from the large social forces operating within the country, and thus we should not pretend the military is a nonpartisan institution made up of nonpartisan service members. The military may prefer Huntington and

his advocacy of a professional, “conservative,” military insulated from the domestic politics of a liberal democracy, but the smart money (given the trends in domestic politics) may be on Janowitz: the country’s partisanship and populism overwhelming the military’s currently sacrosanct status.

## Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank David Burbach and Yanna Krupnikov for their valuable insights. The opinions are the author’s own and do not represent those of the US Naval War College, Navy, or government.

## Notes

1. Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Milley, America’s Top General, Walks Into a Political Battle,” *New York Times*, June 5, 2020, accessed July 21, 2020, <https://nyti.ms/2BGmRNP>.
2. James Mattis, “In Union there Is Strength,” quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “James Mattis Denounces President Trump, Describes Him as a Threat to the Constitution,” *The Atlantic*, June 03, 2020, accessed July 21, 2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/james-mattis-denounces-trump-protests-militarization/612640/>.
3. For quick overview, see Andrew Gelman, “19 Lessons for Political Scientists from the 2016 Election,” *Slate*, December 08, 2016, accessed 20 July 2020, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/12/19-lessons-for-political-scientists-from-the-2016-election.html>.
4. David T. Burbach, “Gaining Trust While Losing Wars: Confidence in the U.S. Military after Iraq and Afghanistan,” *Orbis* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 154–171, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.02.001>.
5. Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood, “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization,” *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (July 2015): 690–707, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152>.
6. Dante Chinni, “Even Before Kaepernick, Nike Just Didn’t Do It for Republicans,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 04, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/campaign-wire-2018-midterms/card/fw6hWNhysgZnVQDQTHbS>; and Chris Jackson and Annaleise Azevedo Lohr, “Reuters/Ipsos Coronavirus Vaccine Survey (05/22/2020),” *Ipsos*, May 21, 2020, accessed July 21, 2020, <https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/reuters-ipsos-data-vaccine-survey-2020-05-21>.
7. David C. King and Zachary Karabell, *The Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the U.S. Military Since Vietnam* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2003).
8. Burbach, “Gaining Trust While Losing Wars.”
9. Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew S. Levendusky, “Drafting Support for War: Conscription and Mass Support for Warfare,” *Journal of Politics* 73, no. 2 (April 2011): 524–534, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611000119>; and Eric Gartzke, “Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States’ Anticipation of Casualties?,” *International*

- Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (September 2001): 467–484, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00210>. Although one sees similar dynamics in countries with conscription. Jonathan D. Caverley, *Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
10. Monica Prasad and Yingying Deng, “Taxation and the Worlds of Welfare,” *Socio-Economic Review* 7, no. 3 (July 2009): 431–457, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwp005>. Its local tax systems, which inequitably fund education, are not.
  11. Gustavo A. Flores-Macias and Sarah E. Kreps, “Borrowing Support for War: The Effect of War Finance on Public Attitudes toward Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 5 (May 2017): 997–1020, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715600762>; and Douglas Kriner, Breanna Lechase, and Rosella Cappella Zielinski, “Self-Interest, Partisanship, and the Conditional Influence of Taxation on Support for War in the USA,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35, no. 1 (January 2018): 43–64, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215611133>.
  12. Caverley, *Democratic Militarism*.
  13. Robert L. Paarlberg, “Knowledge as Power—Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security,” *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 122–151, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0162288041762959>.
  14. Jim Mattis, “National Defense Strategy” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
  15. Heather Krause, *Public Relations Spending: Reported Data on Related Federal Activities*, GAO-16-877R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-877R>.
  16. James Golby, Lindsay Cohn, and Peter Feaver, “Thanks for Your Service: Civilian and Veteran Attitudes after Fifteen Years of War,” in *Warriors & Citizens*, ed. Kori Schake and Jim Mattis (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016).
  17. Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); and Heidi A. Urben, *Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2010).
  18. Dempsey, *Our Army*; and Urben, *Civil-Military Relations*.
  19. Dempsey, *Our Army*.
  20. Golby, Cohn, and Feaver, “Thanks for Your Service.”
  21. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Is Civilian Control of the Military Still an Issue?,” in *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military*, ed. Kori Schake and Jim Mattis (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), 85.
  22. Current and former servicemembers reported a mix of motive, but “pay and benefits” was the most popular reason. Ronald R. Krebs, and Robert Ralston, “Patriotism or Paychecks: Who Believes What About Why Soldiers Serve,” *Armed Forces & Society*, OnlineFirst (April 15, 2020): 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20917166>.
  23. Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Presidio Press, 1982).
  24. James Golby, “Duty, Honor, Party: Ideology, Institutions, and the Use of Military Force” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2011).

25. Hugh Liebert and James Golby, "Midlife Crisis? The All-Volunteer Force at 40," *Armed Forces & Society* 43, no. 1 (2017): 115–138, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X16641430>.
26. David T. Burbach, "Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the US Military, 1973–2016," *Armed Forces & Society* 45, no. 2 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X17747205>.
27. Liebert and Golby, "Midlife Crisis?"; Burbach, "Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the US Military"; and Tom W. Smith, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Michael Hout, *General Social Surveys, 1972–2016: Cumulative Codebook* [Data File and Codebook] (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, September 2017), [https://study.sagepub.com/system/files/gss\\_codebook.pdf](https://study.sagepub.com/system/files/gss_codebook.pdf); Tom W. Smith, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Stephen L. Morgan, *General Social Surveys, 1972–2018: Cumulative Codebook* [Data File and Codebook] (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, December 2019), [http://gss.norc.org/documents/codebook/gss\\_codebook.pdf](http://gss.norc.org/documents/codebook/gss_codebook.pdf).
28. Burbach also points out that the party of the president in office also shapes the divide. Burbach, "Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the US Military."
29. Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, *What Americans Think about America First* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2017).
30. Pew Research Center, *The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 05, 2017), accessed July 20, 2020, <http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/>.
31. Brian J. Gaines, James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Buddy Peyton, and Jay Verkuilen, "Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan Motivation and Opinion on Iraq," *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (November 2007): 857–974, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00601.x>.
32. Rob Suls, "Share of Democrats Calling Russia 'Greatest Danger' to U.S. Is at Its Highest since End of Cold War," Pew Research Center, *FactTank* (blog), April 20, 2017, accessed July 20, 2020, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/20/share-of-democrats-calling-russia-greatest-danger-to-u-s-at-its-highest-since-end-of-cold-war/>.
33. Liebert and Golby, "Midlife Crisis?"
34. Pew Research Center, "Partisan Divide on Political Values."
35. Smith et al., *General Social Surveys*.
36. John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 3 (August 1996): 825–850, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00144.x>.
37. Risa Brooks, "Civil-Military Paradoxes," in Schake and Mattis, *Warriors & Citizens* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016).
38. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 3 (September 2001): 673–687, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401003069>.
39. Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope, "Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings," *Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (April 2008): 556–560, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238160808050X>; and Alan I. Abramowitz and Steven Webster, "The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century," *Electoral Studies* 41 (March 2016): 12–22, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001>.

40. Although some research suggests that most Americans are more likely to dislike partisanship even more than the opposite party. Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov, and John Barry Ryan, "Affective Polarization or Partisan Disdain? Untangling a Dislike for the Opposing Party from a Dislike of Partisanship," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 379–390, <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfy014>.
41. Lilliana Mason, "The Rise of Uncivil Agreement: Issue Versus Behavioral Polarization in the American Electorate," *American Behavioral Scientist* 57, no. 1 (2013): 140–159, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764212463363>; and Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 405–431, <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038>.
42. Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J. Westwood, "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States," *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (May 2019): 129–146, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034>.
43. Liebert and Golby, "Midlife Crisis?"
44. James Golby, Peter Feaver, and Kyle Dropp, "Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion about the Use of Military Force," *Armed Forces & Society* 44, no. 1 (January 2018): 44–71, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16687067>.
45. Matthew S. Levendusky, "Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?" *Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (January 2018): 59–70, <https://doi.org/10.1086/693987>.
46. Richard Wike, Laura Silver, and Alexandra Castillo, *Many Across the Globe Are Dissatisfied with How Democracy Is Working* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, April 29, 2019), [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/Pew-Research-Center\\_Global-Views-of-Democracy-Report\\_2019-04-29\\_Updated-2019-04-30.pdf](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/Pew-Research-Center_Global-Views-of-Democracy-Report_2019-04-29_Updated-2019-04-30.pdf); and Nate Schenkkan and Sarah Repucci, "The Freedom House Survey for 2018: Democracy in Retreat," *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 100–114, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0028>.
47. Phillip Carter, "Unpresidential Command: Trump Is Ordering Service Members to Support the Republican Agenda; That Is Terrifying," *Slate*, July 24, 2017, accessed July 20, 2020, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/trump\\_is\\_ordering\\_service\\_members\\_to\\_support\\_the\\_republican\\_agenda.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/trump_is_ordering_service_members_to_support_the_republican_agenda.html).
48. J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
49. Jonathan D. Caverley and Yanna Krupnikov, "Aiming at Doves: Experimental Evidence of Military Images' Political Effects," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 7 (August 2017): 1482–1509, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715605634>.
50. Frances Lee, *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); and Iyengar et al., "Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization."
51. Francis Fukuyama, "The Populist Surge," *American Interest* 13, no. 4 (March/April 2018): 1–7, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/09/the-populist-surge/>.
52. Walter Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 2 (March/April 2017): 2–7, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/usa/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt>.

53. Ibid.
54. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse," *Perspectives on Politics* 15, no. 2 (June 2017): 443–454, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592717000111>.
55. Katie Simmons, Laura Silver, Courtney Johnson, Kyle Taylor, and Richard Wike, *In Western Europe, Populist Parties Tap Anti-establishment Frustration but Have Little Appeal across Ideological Divide* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, July 12, 2018), <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/07/12/in-western-europe-populist-parties-tap-anti-establishment-frustration-but-have-little-appeal-across-ideological-divide/>.
56. Arab Barometer, "Arab Barometer Wave IV," *Arab Barometer*, 2017, accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.arabbarometer.org/waves/arab-barometer-wave-iv/>; and Latinobarómetro, "Informe 2018," *Corporación Latinobarómetro*, 2018, accessed July 20, 2020, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp>.
57. N. Zorkaya, *Russian Public Opinion – 2018* (Moscow: Levada-Center, 2019), <https://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2018-Eng.pdf>.
58. Richard Wike, Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Janell Fetterolf, *Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 16, 2017), accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-for-representative-and-direct-democracy/>.
59. Nayeli L. Riano, "Brazil's Right-Wing Resurgence," *The American Interest*, October 26, 2018, accessed July 20, 2020, [www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/26/brazils-right-wing-resurgence](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/26/brazils-right-wing-resurgence).
60. But see Tatische M. Nteta and Melinda R. Tarsi, "Self-Selection versus Socialization Revisited: Military Service, Racial Resentment, and Generational Membership," *Armed Forces & Society* 42, no. 2 (April 2016): 362–385, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X15580115>.
61. Dave Philipps, "Inspired by Charlottesville, Military Chiefs Condemn Racism," *New York Times*, August 17, 2017.
62. Burbach, "Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the US Military."
63. Meredith Kleykamp, Crosby Hipes, and Alair MacLean, "Who Supports U.S. Veterans and Who Exaggerates Their Support?" *Armed Forces & Society* 44, no. 1 (January 2018): 92–115, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16682786>.
64. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1957); and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).