Peacekeeping for Rent and Repression

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Abstract

While the role of peacekeepers in reducing conflict in host countries has been studied intensively, research examining the impact of peacekeeping contributions on the Troop-Contributing Country (TCC) itself is in its infancy. These efforts have focused on the economic value of peacekeeping as well as its contribution to a stable, liberalizing state. This paper builds on existing, contradictory empirical findings by arguing that peacekeeping revenue can produce political and economic effects that mimic those of *rentier* states endowed with natural resources. But while other rent sources can provide means for regimes to maintain power through non-repressive measures, supplying peacekeepers also strengthens the central government's specialists in coercion: the military and other security forces. We suggest that the rents and patronage made possible by peacekeeping contributions can help regime stability through two mechanisms: coup-proofing and pro-government repression. Empirically, we focus on the latter: using data on peacekeeping contributions we analyze their correlation to military atrocities within the TCC.

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1 Introduction

At an extraordinary United Nations summit in September 2015, President Barack Obama publicly announced commitments for roughly 40,000 additional troops from over 50 donor countries to support the United Nations' strained international peacekeeping effort. This effort takes place alongside the UN Secretary General's ongoing efforts to overhaul its peacekeeping operations to enhance their effectiveness while minimizing the considerable associated ills (sexual violence, financial corruption, and human rights abuses). At a time when the demand for UN peacekeeping has never been higher, a focus on increased supply and improved performance in the challenging combat environments of "host" states like Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan would appear to be a positive step towards increased stability in troubled parts of the world.

To this end, deployed soldiers gain assets often in short supply in their home countries: lucrative payments, sophisticated training, and substantial combat experience. Yet little is known about how these resources affect domestic politics when peacekeepers come home. Amongst policymakers, there is an often tacit hope that these returning soldiers will help not only in improving the Troop Contributing Country's (TCC) military competence, but also in its development and liberalization. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, Burundi's former head of state, claimed in 2011 that "[Participating in AMISOM] has helped us to create a strong national force and a professional one" (Dickinson, 2011).

Yet, as Burundi's more recent history suggests, this increased demand can have other effects. Over the past two decades, the average peacekeeper comes from (and returns to) a state that is increasingly less wealthy and less democratic. Between 1994 and 2014 the average GDP per capita of donor states (weighted by personnel contribution) has declined by 64%. In 2015 four of the five largest contributions came from countries–Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Rwanda–whose large militaries play an outsized role in domestic and regional politics, including violence against civilians. This paper explores important implications of this trend.

We tie multiple existing empirical findings together into a theory laying out two major means by which peacekeeping can shape domestic politics. First, peacekeeping can produce rent-like revenues that resemble the "resource curse" normally associated with oil. For Fiji, the world's largest peacekeeper contributor per capita, salaries alone can amount to anywhere from a quarter to a half of its entire military budget (Coulon, 1998, 37-38). This not only delivers foreign exchange directly to the central government but can serve as an effective means of buying military loyalty. Second, while resource wealth has been associated with non-repression in many *rentier* states, peacekeeping rent works through the state's primary means of coercion: the military and police forces. Returning peacekeepers can represent a large influx of military human capital thanks to their training, counterinsurgency experience, and professional prestige. These forces can be a source of increased repression of civilians for regimes seeking to remain in power. Thus peacekeepers can improve regime stability albeit at a cost in civilian victimization.

In addition to explaining previous empirical findings, our theory new hypotheses for testing. Our primary empirical contribution therefore focuses on the most important, and illiberal, means by which a strengthened security apparatus funded by rents can support its patron regime. Using peacekeeper contribution data, we find that an increasing number of peacekeeper-months correlates to more military-instigated atrocities–using a host of measurements of this dependent variable–within the troop-contributing country.

2 What do Peacekeepers Do, Where do They Come From, and What do They Gain?

Peacekeeping is "any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes" (Deihl, 1994, 4). While, in the past, peacekeeping only referred to efforts to preserve international security without enforcement powers, the distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping

is no longer strictly maintained (Fortna and Howard, 2008, 285). Peacekeeping operations (PKO) now involve a variety of complex activities beyond simply enforcing peace (Findlay, 1996, 17-20). In addition to increased combat, peacekeepers now monitor elections, take on gang violence, help demobilize combatants and rebuild domestic institutions.

Most research on peacekeeping has addressed its effectiveness of these missions at preserving peace in a post-conflict setting, finding a robust association between peacekeeping and positive outcomes (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008). But peacekeeping is a complex undertaking in unfamiliar and often threatening environments. Many of the 15 UN peacekeeping operations around the world in 2018 more closely resemble counterinsurgencies than more traditional missions. Two thirds of peacekeepers are deployed to active combat zones rather than operations in which soldiers separate and monitor two sides after fighting has ended.

2.1 The Supply Side

Despite the pressures of these deployments, policymakers have attributed a host of benefits to the TCC for providing peacekeepers for deployment abroad (International Peace Institute, 2015). Excepting some notable case studies (Dwyer, 2015; Brosig, 2017), research to date has largely focused on benign professionalization of the returning soldiers (Krastev, 2010). Nick Birnback, a spokesman for UN PKO and former peacekeeper, makes the positive case succinctly, "Their militaries are brought up to higher standards because we train under international standards, and we hold our forces accountable to these international norms and standards...So they tend to get battalions back who are more capable. It's sort of the 'rising tide lifts all boats,' so they come back sometimes as better forces than when they left" (Krastev, 2010). Charles Moskos (1975) posited that involvement in peacekeeping would increase a peacekeeper's professionalism and respect for democracy. PKO may shift the military's outlook from internal to external security (Desch, 1999, 122), thus being "lured away from domestic politics" (Pion-Berlin, 2000; Pevehouse, 2002, 417). Sotomayor (2014a)



a)1994



b) 2014

Figure 1: Comparing Peacekeeper Contributions, GDP per capita, and Polity IV Scores

proposes a "socialization" mechanism where exposure to "Western" peacekeepers in these operations leads a more "professional" attitude to civil-military relations upon peacekeepers' return.

Empirically, however, Sotomayor (2014a) finds that increased peacekeeping by democratizing states has widely divergent outcomes. Argentina successfully used peacekeeping

experience in Haiti to increase civilian control over the military not long after its Dirty War. But the experience of Uruguay and Brazil on the same Haitian mission reduced civilian control. Sotomayor (2014b) looks beyond South America to Nepal and finds that here too peacekeeping reinforced existing but dysfunctional civil-military relations.

We, along with Kathman and Melin (2016) and Levin et al. (2016), find the peacekeeper liberalization thesis somewhat paradoxical given what actually occurs during these missions. There is reason for skepticism that a few months' (or even a year's) worth of operational experience can change one's normative outlook significantly. Instead, we argue that such deployments more likely reinforce pre-existing norms and missions. Increasingly, the Brazilian military had been called upon to "pacify" the crime-ridden favelas of Rio and other cities. Sixty percent of its soldiers in this pacification program have peacekeeping experience in Haiti where they performed similar anti-gang sweeps involving rapid assaults with armor to seize central locations followed by months of intensive and intrusive armed patrols. Like almost all counterinsurgencies, this pacification program was accompanied by significant violence and alleged human rights abuses, such as the 42 deaths resulting from the storming of the Complexo do Alemão in 2010 (Harig, 2015; Purdeková et al., 2018). In short, in terms of assets actually provided by peacekeeping experience, we suggest examining the money and combat skills before considering socialization into liberal norms. This is especially relevant given trends in which states actually contribute the bulk of peacekeepers.

2.1.1 Trends in TCCs: Poorer and Less Democratic

Whereas in earlier periods, Neack (1995, 194) observed that TCCs consisted largely of "Western states whose interests are served by the status quo and a few non-Western states that lay claim to some prestige in international affairs," the type of country contributing peacekeepers has changed (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). In all probability the interests served by peacekeeping have also shifted.

Figure 1 graphically compares the differences in the contribution (UN), wealth (World

Bank, 2013) and regime type (Gurr et al., 2002) of TCCs between 1994 and 2014.[1] Some trends are readily apparent. Over time the bubble sizes, which indicate the annual total peacekeeper-months for each contributing state, have both swelled (there are more peacekeepers now than a decade ago) and grown more skewed (compared to the 1990s, some states contribute many more peacekeepers while others contribute a token few). Second, poorer states now send more troops; the larger bubbles have slid to the left (i.e. along the GDP per capita axis) over time. Finally, the larger bubbles now spread more evenly across the Polity IV axis. While few clear autocracies (possibly excepting China) contribute peacekeepers, many prominent peacekeeper contributors (Bangladesh, Rwanda, Egypt) are located in the "anocratic" zone of being neither democratic nor autocratic regimes. Several others (Pakistan, Nigeria, Nepal) hover at a Polity score of 5-7, as either marginal or fragile democracies. Kathman and Melin (2016, 2) therefore identify a "paradox in peacekeeping. . . unstable states contribute more peacekeeping troops, helping create stability elsewhere." Once one controls for number of peacekeepers contributed the trend is undeniable. Whatever we might say about democracies, it is unlikely that non-democracies contribute in order to liberalize the planet (or themselves) through peacekeeping.

2.1.2 Follow the Money

The financing of peacekeeping represents a large transfer of wealth from the richest countries to the rest of the world. In 2017, the UN peacekeeping budget was about $8 billion with just ten countries assessed over 80% of the expense (United Nations, 2018). The United States alone funds 29% of the budget, but contributes less than a hundred of its own soldiers. Peacekeeping can therefore be lucrative for the TCC. Not only does it receive direct payments for peacekeepers, but equipment and training are often provided (or costs covered). Moreover, richer countries tend to reward developing TCCs with more aid, even when not directly tied to peacekeeping (Boutton and Orazio, 2013; Emmanuel, 2015; Henke, 2016).

[1]Note that a dynamic version of this graph can be found at AUTHOR WEBSITE.

Given these resources, in poorer states with a high relative factor endowment of military labor to capital, both individual soldiers and their governments can profit from what Bove and Elia (2011, 703) call the "mercenarization of UN forces." Indeed, focusing on economic benefits to TCCs has occupied a large amount of research on the supply side of peacekeeping (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Victor, 2010). Lundgren (2018) finds this peacekeeping revenue so tempting that the United Nations can encourage liberalization by threatening to exclude a TCC from further missions (and more money), thereby detering military coups. Lundgren also provides some evidence that states that send peacekeepers abroad "firm up democratic governance."

On the other hand, Cunliffe (2014) and Coleman and Nyblade (2018) argue that the profit motive is overstated. A number of factors–inflation, size of the military and the economy– determine whether peacekeeping can be a reliable income source. According to Coleman and Nyblade (2018), many top UN troop contributors do not meet the "plausibility conditions" of profitability. Williams (2017, 2) also argues for more nuanced assessment of peacekeeping's economic benefits in a close study of the six countries contributing to the African Union mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Rather than security concerns, "a combination of institutional benefits (related to the armed forces), political advantages (concerning prestige and partnerships with key external actors), and economic support (for individual peacekeepers and the domestic security sector)" largely motivated these states' decision to contribute troops.

As Coleman and Nyblade (2018, 2) observe, "the conditions for profiting from UN peacekeeping reimbursements are highly restrictive, and financial benefits are not sufficiently common and substantial to adequately explain the prominence of developing states among UN peacekeepers." Building on the empirical work of Williams (2017), we offer a theory that explains the contradictory evidence. Regimes in developing states do not necessarily wish to maximize "profit" but instead seek to ensure their political survival.

3 A Theory of Rent and Repression

We are not the first to argue that foreign aid, arms transfers, and military training can enable autocrats to hold onto power (Reno, 1997). Brosig (2017) builds on De Waal's (2015, 190-193) work on "rentier militarism" in the Horn of Africa to identify the presence of "rentier peacekeeping" in Burundi. Another strand of research regards returning peacekeepers as a potential threat. Kathman and Melin (2016) argue that outsourcing the funding and maintaining of soldiers through PKO allows states to solve the guns-butter dilemma, because the newly-empowered military is kept abroad to prevent it from interfering in domestic politics. Levin et al. (2016) argues that returning peacekeepers are more likely to cause a coup (or prop up an existing junta), although its two cases of Bangladesh and Fiji, as well as quantitative analysis (Lundgren, 2018), do not provide strong support for this claim.[2]

Here we incorporate these two aspects of TCCs–the use of peacekeeping income and the conduct of returning soldiers–with a theory linking the resources from peacekeeping rent to a specific outcome: regime stability through improved and more frequent coercion by state security forces. We do this through two specific mechanisms: the resource curse and the addition of military human capital.

3.1 A Peacekeeper Resource Curse?

The effects of government revenue from peacekeeping can mimic those of the "resource curse," helping to prop up an autocratic regime, an uncompetitive economy, or both. Many economic and political maladies have been associated with the exploitation of assets such as oil and diamonds: corruption, increased state-ownership of businesses, durable authoritarianism, and more frequent civil violence (Colgan, 2013).

A large component of the "curse" rests on *rentier* politics that produce low tax rates, high corruption and patronage, and lower levels of political accountability (Ross, 2012).

[2]Levin et al. (2016) acknowledges that the Bangladesh case does not provide much support. Fiji's Commodore Frank Bainimarama did seize power in a coup in 2007, but has successfully used patronage (much of it from peacekeeping) to maintain his hold on power since.

One of the major correlates of oil wealth is regime stability in authoritarian states (Ulfelder, 2007; Wright et al., 2013). According to Ross (2012, 63), "oil has kept autocrats in power by enabling them to increase spending, reduce taxes, buy the loyalty of the armed forces, and conceal their own corruption and incompetence." Rent's effects are not limited to oil, but also to aid and other non-tax revenue (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Ahmed, 2012). Indeed, the political economic argument in which wealthy donor states fund "small-coalition" (i.e. authoritarian) states for policy concessions at the expense of the recipient state's citizens' interests (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009) maps closely onto the current, Western-funded peacekeeping system.

We do not suggest that peacekeeping has the same level of effect as large amounts of oil, only that insights from this stream of research shed light on the political effects of peacekeeping. With the possible exceptions of extremely poor states such as Fiji, Burkina Faso, or even Bangladesh, peacekeeping does not dominate the economy the way oil frequently does. Several qualitative overlaps exist, however. First, the deployment of the military and thus of peacekeeping is almost entirely under the control of the central government. Second, peacekeeping revenue is external to the state, comes in the form of foreign exchange, and goes through the central government. Finally, a small percentage of the population is involved in producing this rent.

For uncompetitive economies that depend on imports and thus foreign exchange, peacekeeping can be an essential source of income. As outgoing Fijian commanding general Mosese Tikoitoga observed in 2007, "our economy has no choice but to build armies, and it's a good business. There are few other foreign investments" (Copetas, 2007). Even if one only looks at salaries, rather than all revenue associated with PKO, peacekeeping can be an extraordinary source of revenue for very poor states. How much is given to the soldiers themselves depends on the government. The African Union, supported by the United States and others, initially paid Uganda $750 per month for each soldier serving in Somalia, of which the Ugandan government kept $500 (Barkan, 2011). Thus one peacekeeper produces income for

the government that is over *ten times* that countries' GDP per capita.[3] A relatively small number of laborers can therefore produce an inordinate amount of cash for a state relative to taxing other internal activities.

Peacekeeping income, and the associated aid that comes with it, can keep militaries artificially large. Djibouti's tiny military expanded by 20% in order to deploy an 850-strong battalion to AMISOM (Williams, 2017, 9). In exchange for agreeing to deploy this battalion in 2010, the government submitted a $53 million wish list of equipment (its defense budget that year was $12 million). The United States agreed to provide $6.3 million that year using its ACOTA peacekeeping fund, supplying 100 military vehicles, a peacekeeping training camp, and other materiel (Williams, 2017, 8-9).

Moreover, the income from peacekeeping revenue is often "off the books" in terms of government budgets and thus its ultimate use is far from transparent in countries such as Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria (Ball and le Roux, 2006). Considering that in 2010 peacekeeping revenue amounted to 60 percent of Ghana's defense budget (Aubyn and Aning, 2013), this is not a small pool of money available for coup-proofing. And indeed, the peacekeeping mission itself can be a source of patronage, as the government decides which soldiers and units can go on these lucrative operations. Finally, many of the largest peacekeeper contributions come from states with centralized political and economic planning (Fisher et al., 2015, 140). Much of the revenue from peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, and Nepal is channeled through army "welfare funds" which often play an intimate and over-sized role (relative to developed states) in the domestic economy. For example, the holding company of Rwanda's armed forces represents over 3 percent of the country's economy (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, 389).[4]

The regime remains the channel through which peacekeepers receive their allowances for deploying. Coleman and Nyblade (2018) argues that the large amount of money going to

[3]If Uganda is perfectly successful at collecting its stated income tax rate (30%) of its annual economic activity, the per person revenue is the equivalent of 35 individuals.

[4]Walmart's annual revenues in 2014 were 2.7% of the United States GDP.

the soldiers themselves shows a low profit margin for peacekeeping, but if we regard this as patronage designed to keep the military loyal to the regime, this distinction seems less salient. Whereas clientelism in many weak states often relies on a small set of elites (Van de Walle, 2001, 53-55), peacekeeping provides a mechanism for the regime to bypass these elites and gain the support of rank and file military actors. This could strengthen the army's, or select units within it, loyalty to the regime in a way that other forms of patronage may not, further cementing the military's value as a political tool for regime stability.

Regimes can use their peacekeeping contributions not only to gain these aforementioned resources directly linked to peacekeeeping, but also to justify broader aid packages from international donors. Nigeria only contributed after receiving $18 billion in debt relief from the Paris Club (Henke, 2016). Thailand, cut off from US security assistance following its coup in 2006, tied its contribution to the resumption of military cooperation with the United States. TCC can also avoid arm-twisting to liberalize. While Lundgren (2018) uses Fiji as an example of the liberalizing pressure the UN can put on TCCs, the case actually illustrates his argument that high demand prevents the UN from carrying out its threats. Despite threatening to suspend Fiji's peacekeeping after its 2006 coup–the fourth in the past 45 years–the United Nations, desperate for more troops, instead accepted more Fijian personnel soon afterward. Frank Bainimarama, that coup's leader, remains in power after winning a 2014 election in a landslide after ruling autocratically for eight years (Levin et al., 2016). By being the primarily contributor to ECOMOG in Liberia, Nigeria's Abacha regime shielded itself from US criticism of its domestic repression (Reno, 1998, 219-220). It seems clear that countries like Uganda (Fisher, 2012) and Rwanda (Beswick, 2014) have used their peacekeeping contributions to lessen the pressure for domestic reforms from international donors. Henke (2016)'s in-depth analysis of contributions to UNAMID in Darfur illustrate the range of aid and tolerance leveraged by potential TCCs.

3.2 Peacekeeping As Military Human Capital Source

In terms of a "curse," what peacekeeping revenue lacks in size relative to petroleum, it may make up for in terms of its specificity. Oil-based revenue provides flexibility to a regime in its bid to maintain power, and indeed, according to one examination of oil rentierism, "regimes that repress less are more stable than those that repress more" (Smith, 2015, 2).[5] But in the case of peacekeeping, this rent is associated with the strengthening of the state's primary means of coercive violence.

Returning peacekeepers bring back to their country increased "military human capital" (Savage and Caverley, 2017). The benefits consist in part of professional knowledge enabling recipients to conduct military operations, including internal security operations, more effectively. Peacekeeping has a much greater capacity to infuse soldiers with human capital compared to the indigenous capacities of many states (Kathman and Melin, 2016; Levin et al., 2016). Bangladeshi helicopter pilots can practice flying without fuel and maintenance budget constraints (Axe, 2010). The United States alone has trained over 250,000 African peacekeepers since 2005, including nearly one fifth of Rwanda's military. In 2013 this training cost $2,600 per Rwandan soldier, more than doubling that country's per capita military budget of $2,485 (US State Department).

Beyond formal training, peacekeepers–especially on certain missions–gain large amounts of operational experience. Peacekeepers are, almost by definition, deployed into volatile regions where violence is a possibility. Soldiers will often learn to rely on "abusive force" in efforts to control large gatherings of people (Sotomayor, 2014a, 193). For Brazil, Haiti "essentially served as a training ground for pacification strategies, reinforcing inward-looking doctrines practiced in the country's slums and urban settings" (Sotomayor, 2014a, 193). In short, peacekeepers come back to their country with the ability to provide *internal* security.

Research has well established that UN peacekeeping missions largely reflect the interests–only one of which is democratization–of the states that authorize them rather than the UN

[5] Although see DeMeritt and Young (2013).

itself (Allen and Yuen, 2014; Stojek and Tir, 2014; Benson and Kathman, 2014; Howard and Dayal, 2018).[6] Indeed, the largest funder of peacekeeping, the United States, appears to have a more pragmatic view of its effects on TCCs, viewing it as a component of a larger security strategy. As it winds down its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States increasingly relies on a more indirect approach–variously called "security assistance," "partner capacity-building," and "phase zero operations"–to advance its interests. Peacekeeping appears to be a fundamental component of this. Currently, its Global Peace Operations Initiative emphasizes "actual deployments, effectiveness in PSOs, improvement of capacities, and self-sufficiency;" paying less attention to human rights or civil-military relations (US State Department, 2015). This influx of military human capital represents a potential coercive asset for many regimes.

3.2.1 A Mild Guardianship Dilemma

Traditionally, showering resources on a military can be a dangerous game, variously known as the "moral hazard of authoritarian repression" (Svolik, 2012), the "civil-military problematique" (Feaver, 1996), and the "guardianship dilemma" (MacMahon and Slantchev, 2015). And some previous research suggests that returning peacekeepers present a threat to regimes (Kathman and Melin, 2016; Levin et al., 2016). Savage and Caverley (2017) associates increased foreign military training with increased coups, while Böhmelt et al. (2018) suggest more generally that increasing competence and professionalism can undermine civil military relations. We argue, however, that the guardianship dilemma from increased peacekeeper human capital is relatively mild for most regimes.

First, cash comes back to the regime along with the peacekeeper. It is up to the central government to distribute the wages. Given the vast disparity between per capita peacekeeping income and many country's domestic equivalent, the division of this income may be conflictual but there should still be sufficient resources to compensate the newly-empowered soldiers as well as engage in coup-proofing. Moreover, the regime decides who can go on these

[6] Although see Beardsley and Schmidt (2012).

missions. Jowell (2015) identifies how attendance at Western-funded peacekeeping training centers in Africa themselves serve as a potent patronage source.

Second, in the case of peacekeeping, recipients of increased human capital are more likely to be enlisted soldiers than officers (Sotomayor, 2014a, 193). This limits the political leverage they might have, and their capacity to organize action at a high level. Peacekeepers from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burundi, and Gambia have mutinied for improved conditions (Dwyer, 2015). In an interesting twist on this paper's logic, Bangladeshi border patrol forces mutinied, resulting in 72 deaths, in order to be allowed to serve in lucrative UN peacekeeping operations (Manik, 2009). Mutinies rarely threaten the regime, however, and indeed often target senior officers rather than civilian leadership.

In short, we theorize returning peacekeepers pose little threat to the regime, and instead can be a loyal asset for repression. The link between peacekeeping contributions can lead to increased regime stability has been found in multiple studies. Larger troop contributions lead to increased coercion by security forces at home, not only because PKO produce better (and more loyal) repressers, but because the international community allows more of it to happen. To support our causal mechanism empirically, this paper's hypothesis tests the mechanism by which governments stay in power: violence.

H States that contribute more personnel to peacekeeping operations are more likely to experience pro-government violence and civilian victimization by military forces.

4 The Illustrative Case of Burundi

With a long history of military involvement in politics, repression, and ethnic violence; Burundi is far from a hard case for our theory. Indeed, one of the reasons Burundi has featured prominently in discussions of peacekeeping as an important source of TCC security sector reform is *because* Burundi seems an unlikely location for positive outcomes (Siegle, 2015). Reviewing the evidence suggest that serving abroad in peacekeeping missions has lowered the

possibility of ethnic violence between the Hutu majority and the former ruling Tutsi minority (Samii, 2013). However, while the potential for genocide has been reduced, peacekeeping appears to also play a fundamental role in the regime's consolidation of autocratic power and has accompanied a steep surge in state repression, including extrajudicial killing by security forces (Vandeginste, 2015, 625). It is for this reason that we examine Burundi to illustrate our theoretical mechanisms: using peacekeeping revenue to maintain military loyalty, using security forces for repression, and shielding the regime from international pressure

Observers have credited peacekeeping revenue and experience for sustaining a multi-ethnic army in the aftermath of a disastrous civil war that lasted from 1993-2006 (Wilén et al., 2015). The Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (signed in 2000) and the follow-on constitution of 2005 deliberately divided a new Burundian military (FND) among the Tutsi soldiers of the defunct Armed Forces of Burundi (FAB) and Hutu rebels.[7] The main Hutu rebel group, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) has been Burundi's ruling party, led by Pierre Nkurunziza, since the ceasefire in 2005.

Burundi sent its first peacekeepers abroad in 2007, just months after the peacekeeping mission within its own borders concluded. It has consistently deployed about 30% of its army on such missions, most notably to the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM, largely funded by the EU). Peacekeeping has kept the FND artificially but usefully large. One Western diplomat described Burundi's turn to PKO as "a release valve... They have a bloated military because they've been obliged to take in all the former rebels, and it offers an opportunity to sort that out" (Dickinson 2011, see also Williams 2017). The $200-400 collected by the central government per peacekeeper amounts to roughly a quarter to a half of the defense budget.[8] On top of this, the military receives extensive military assistance from abroad, primarily through the United States' ACOTA program. From 2011-2015, the

[7]Hutus make up 80% of Burundi's population.

[8]Most estimates have the government taking $200, but other reports place the value at 400-500 (Dickinson, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2017, 11).

United States has covered the costs of over 28,000 Burundian trainees (the FND has 20,000 soldiers).[9] In 2014, the United States provided Burundi with over $18 million in security assistance.[10] Belgium and France have also provided support.

By as early as 2013 at least 70% of the military had rotated through at least one deployment in Somalia (Ndayiziga, 2013, 4). Soldiers deployed on these missions receive approximately $500-800 monthly, compared to their normal wages of $40 a month. This has allowed many military members to join the middle class; a neighborhood in the city of Gitega is known as the "Quartier Somali" due to so many returning peacekeepers buying land and building houses (Moncrieff and Vircoulon, 2017).

Since his re-election in 2010, Nkurunziza has steadily amassed power for his CNDD-FDD party (and for himself within the party), taking steps to fragment opposition parties, control more media sources and generally make the public sphere less conducive to dissent (Van Acker, 2015). One observer lists the major sources of patronage available to the regime, "public procurement processes, the mining sector, international financial assistance, and reimbursements for peacekeeping deployments" (Siegle, 2015).

In April 2015 Nkurunziza announced he would run for a third term, widely regarded as unconstitutional. Public demonstrations against this move were violently suppressed by security forces, primarily an armed component of the ruling party's *Imbonerakure* youth wing (Siegle, 2015). Prior to the election, General Godefroid Niyombare,–a Hutu, former rebel, and peacekeeping commander–launched a coup. It fizzled quickly; most of the FND remained loyal along with its head, General Pontien Gaciyubwenge. In their respective bids for the loyalty of the troops, both factional leaders–Niyombare and Gaciyubwenge–explicitly stated that AMISOM deployments would continue. In its waning moments, one of coup leader, General Cyrille Ndayirukiye, publicly attributed failure to "overpowering military determination to support the system in power." At his court-martial, Ndayirukiye castigated

[9]http://securityassistance.org/data/country/trainee

[10]This was an unusually high amount. The average from 2010-2014 was about $6 million. http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Burundi/2000/2018/all/Global//.

his fellow soldiers who "seemed indifferent waiting for their AMISOM deployment."

In the wake of the coup, election, and Nkurunziza's assumption of a third term, Burundi has descended into violence, with 300,000 displaced persons fleeing to neighboring countries and an estimated 500 people killed (Siegle, 2015; UN High Commisioner for Refugees, 2016). An AU report has described the crisis as growing increasingly "militarized" (African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights, 2015).

Understanding the role that its AMISOM funding might be playing in propping up Nkurunziza, the European Union announced it would cut off funds in March 2016. Accordingly, Nkurunziza threatened to withdraw Burundi soldiers from AMISOM. Faced with the loss of almost a third of the peacekeeping force, the EU backed down. While the EU now channels peacekeeping funds through a bank rather than the Burundi central government, it seems clear that the Nkurunziza regime nonetheless still takes its percentage (International Crisis Group, 2017, 13). And at any rate, the money going directly to peacekeepers continues to serve as a potent source of patronage for the security forces, allowing it "to keep 25,000 former rebels and troops happy regardless of how the country is run or how well the government's own budget is spent" (Moncrieff and Vircoulon, 2017).

The Nkurunziza regime continues to leverage peacekeeping to maintain its hold on power. Peacekeeping appears to be the only external source of funding available to the regime. Moreover observers have claimed that the regime is increasingly favoring CNDD-FDD-associated soldiers for peacekeeping deployments (Vircoulon, 2015). Four Army officers serving in the UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) have been repatriated after the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights linked them directly in pro-regime violence at home (Sieff, 2016; Reuters, 2016). Since September 2016, MINUSCA no longer accepts Burundian police officers, after a Burundian human rights organization (FOCODE) accused the regime of rewarding loyalists implicated in human rights violations. While a much larger Burundian Army contingent still serves in MINUSCA, investigation of its connection to pro-regime violence is ongoing. One observer states the link frankly, "There have been some in the military

who believe that if they engage in violence–violently suppress opposition or the rebellion–they will be able to reap the reward of their allegiance by being sent abroad" (Brosig, 2017; Reuters, 2016).

Nkurunziza's efforts to reshape the FND correlate to its increased involvement in domestic politics. In the initial wave of 2015 repression the FND appeared to remain professional and eschewed hurting civilians relative to the police and the *Imbonerakure* (Siegle, 2015). However, the army now appears increasingly implicated in the violence. Both the US Department of State and Human Rights Watch have blamed the army for extrajudicial killings in the periphery of the country in later December 2015 and early January 2016, and atrocities attributed to the security services predate this by several years (Human Rights Watch, 2015). A 2017 UNHCR report observes that the FND "has played an increasingly active role in the repression of real or presumed opponents... military personnel have been identified as the alleged perpetrators of summary executions, arbitrary arrests, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."

In short while the ability to inflate the ranks of the armed forces has to date successfully reduced the potential for ethnic violence, advocates overestimated peacekeeping's capacity as a potent avenue to "Security Sector Reform." The regime is quite stable relative to predecessor regimes, has grown increasingly authoritarian, easily shrugged off a military coup, and employs its security services–including the army–for state violence. Having successfully leveraged the threat of withdrawal from AMISOM to secure continued funding, Nkurunziza can maintain a loyal military and a steady source of hard currency that appears impervious to international pressure and domestic protests. With aid disappearing and the economy cratering, peacekeeping is quite literally the regime's only revenue stream. It does appear sufficient to maintain the violent governing equilibrium however.

5 Data and Analysis

To date, evidence for the rentier nature of peacekeeping resources has largely been qualitative, and no research has connected it to violence against civilians in support of the regime.[11] We test our argument with a time-series cross-sectional dataset containing 216 countries and ranging from 1990-2014.

5.1 Dependent Variables: Pro-Government Violence and Civilian Victimization

We used a variety of dependent variables to capture increases in political violence associated with the military. Finding variables that directly measure military involvement is difficult and most measures have different associated problems, risks of false positives or false negatives. To surmount this problem we constructed six different versions of the dependent variable using a variety of different sources; consistent results should increase confidence in the robustness of the findings. These variables are described below.

From the SPEED Civil Unrest data (Nardulli et al., 2015), we constructed a dummy variable for a *"destabilizing state event"* or attack initiated by a government-affiliated soldier that year. SPEED defines this as: "extraordinary acts of government or ordinary acts performed with malfeasance including the failure to perform routine duties." These acts must have the government as an initiator and be carried out by the agent acting in their official role. We subset these events to look at those carried out by the military. This dataset measures a variety of politically expressive events and politically motivated violence and repression, and as a result measures the broad range of disruptive effects that could be associated with peacekeeping. For example, this variable does not rely on the relatively extreme outcome of killing. Instead, it can capture instances such as the military being used for crowd control or arrests. This will allow us to determine if peacekeeping is associated

[11] Kathman and Melin (2016) show that peacekeeping contributions tend to increase after coup attempts, but here we use peacekeeping as the explanatory variable.

with the military being used for more mundane acts of repression, as well as atrocities.

The second dependent variable was constructed using the Political Instability Task Force's (PITF) World Wide Atrocities dataset. Using these data, we constructed a binary variable measuring if an atrocity had been committed by the military during a given year. This dataset defines an *Atrocity* as an "implicitly or explicitly political, direct, and deliberate violent action resulting in the death of noncombatant civilians". For practical reasons, PITF coded all atrocities that involved the deaths of five or more civilians. These data provide us with a means to directly measure military involvement in abusing human rights following peacekeeping.

Third, we made use of the Phoenix historical data set. We used the data from BBC world service because it provides the best coverage of the period that we interested in studying. First, we filtered for those actions taken by the military targeting civilians. The Phoenix dataset measures conflict and cooperation using CAMEO, a twenty point scale measuring cooperation or conflict related to a political event. We constructed a dummy variable for an event that qualified as "material conflict" or scores higher 15 or higher using the CAMEO code. Additionally we included if the military made threats (CAMEO 13) toward non-government actors.

Fourth, we followed a similar procedure using the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) data. We filtered for actions where one of the source actors is listed as the military and where the targets were non-government actors. As with the previous variable the CAMEO code was used, material conflicts and threats were included.

We also used two variables general measures of human rights abuses. These variables measure worsening human rights in general, not just actions taken by the military. We used Cingranelli and Richard's human rights data. This data contains aggregated and disaggregated measures of human rights abuse. We used the aggregated measure of Physical Integrity Rights. Finally, we also used the Human Rights Protection index which was constructed by Fariss (2014) using Item Response Models.

5.2 Independent Variables

We argue that human capital in the military at large should increase with the number of soldiers deployed and the amount of time these soldiers spend peacekeeping. To measure these factors, we use the variable UN *Peacekeeper Months* supplied by a TCC for a given year.

5.3 Alternate Explanations and Confounding Variables

We control for potential confounding factors. We include *Total Aid*, from all international sources (logged and noarmlized by GDP) as high levels of aid dependency increase the state's vulnerability to external influence (Tierney et al., 2011).

We also include *Spending per Soldier* as higher levels may increase the loyalty of the military to the current regime (Powell, 2012; Besley and Robinson, 2010), can proxy for the quality of a soldier prior to deployment abroad, and can determine a PKO's profitability. This variable was created by dividing total military spending from SIPRI 2018 by the total number of armed personnel taken from the Correlates of Wars (Singer, 1987).

Political and social development are likely to influence both violence and peacekeeping deployments (Johnson et al., 1984; McGowan and Johnson, 1984). In addition to *GDP per capita* (World Bank, 2013), we also include controls for *Economic Growth* (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Alesina et al., 1996). Civil war can undermine regime stability and create incentives for regimes and the military to engage in human rights abuses. For this reason, a dummy variable was included that coded if the country was involved in a *Civil War* during that year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). We include the overall level of *Democracy* using Polity data (Gurr et al., 2002); regime type shape coup-proofing, respect for human rights, and the desire to send peacekeepers (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). In addition we included a variable measuring *Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization* (Alesina et al., 2003).

5.4 Method of Analysis

To model the predicted probability of a our first three, dichotomous dependent variables, we used logistic regression. Taking time seriously in the broader sense we followed the recommendation of Carter and Signorino (2010) and included a cubic time trend, based on years since the last event. For the final two, continuous dependent variables we ran OLS models with lagged dependent variables. As the Fariss variable was constructed using Item Response models, to account for the uncertainty incorporated into this variable, we constructed five different versions of the dependent variable using simulation from the posterior distribution, ran the models on the five different datasets, and combined the results using Rubin's rule (Schnakenberg and Fariss, 2014).



Figure 2: Simulated predicted probabilities as Peacekeeper Months varies.

5.5 Results

We find evidence linking peacekeeper deployments and repression. In addition to the results presented here, we ran numerous robustness checks reported in the appendix. Figure 2

depicts predicted probabilities of our various measures of military repression derived from simulations across the full range of our explanatory variable.

To give a more rounded idea of the substantive effects, we also calculated some first differences. The first dependent variable used to capture increased violence and political action by military actors was Destabilizing Events from the SPEED data. In this case we see a significant 1.5% increase in predicted probability of destabilizing event conducted by a military actor, moving from 10th to 90th quantiles and holding other variables at their mean or mode. This amounts to a 28% increase over the baseline probability of 5.2%.

Also in line with expectations, we find a significant relationship between Peacekeeper Months and an increased probability of a Military Atrocity. To determine the substantive effect, we calculate the predicted probabilities of an atrocity from the 10th to 90th quantiles of the explanatory variable. This change amounts to 0.2 %. Considering the relative rarity of military atrocities this is a substantial increase, around a 10% increase over the baseline risk.

Using the same methods, we find a small, significant change in the probability that the military is used coercively to target non-government actors using the Phoenix dataset. However, the effect is arguably not substantively significant in the positive direction. Amounting to only .03% change in the over probability. This is a 10% increase over the baseline. Across the full range of the variable the change amounts to around 15% in absolute terms. With the ICEWS variable the change is larger in substantive terms, around 2.5%. But due to the much larger number of positive observations that were uncovered using this dataset, the relative changes are smaller, also around 2%.

Using CIRI and Fariss we again find significant relationships in the predicted direction. We find small, but statistically significant reductions in human rights associated with peacekeeping commitments using both these variables. This demonstrates that the association we hypothesize may be larger enough to show up in variables measuring the state of human rights generally, not just actions by the military (see 1).

The results above demonstrate that there is an increase in the level of violence associated with peacekeeping commitments. This finding provides indirect support for the contention that peacekeeping improves the capabilities of the sending state's armed forces. More importantly, it supports our hypotheses that peacekeeping can lead to more pro-regime coercion at home, and undermines the belief that involvement in peacekeeping necessarily improves a military's normative commitments to human rights.

Table 1: Peacekeeper months and repression

	Dependent variable:					
	DSA	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	Physical Integrity(CIRI)	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Troop	0.00004***	0.00001***	0.00001***	0.00004***	−0.00001***	−0.00000***
Months	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP (logged)	0.163	−0.041	0.006	−0.006	0.036	0.004
	(0.226)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.071	−0.043	0.130	−0.090	0.056**	0.004
	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.093)	(0.080)	(0.027)	(0.003)
Growth	−0.011	−0.002	0.015	0.004	−0.007	0.0004
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.0005	−0.009*	0.001	0.003**	0.001*	−0.00002
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.011	−0.057***	−0.011	−0.018	0.016***	0.001**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years Since Last Coup	0.009*	0.008	0.023***	−0.005	−0.004**	−0.001***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.248***	1.680***	2.019***	1.815***	−0.750***	−0.016*
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.188)	(0.370)	(0.078)	(0.009)
ELF	−0.122	0.600*	0.818**	0.115	0.030	−0.006
	(0.343)	(0.361)	(0.358)	(0.300)	(0.102)	(0.012)
UN Voting Ideal Point	−0.052	0.108	0.087	0.175	0.187***	0.007
	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.044)	(0.005)
Physical Integrity$_{t-1}$					0.698***	
					(0.016)	
Fariss$_{t-1}$						0.984***
						(0.004)
Constant	−0.942	−1.656*	−4.590***	5.355***	1.165***	0.021
	(0.811)	(0.884)	(0.989)	(0.796)	(0.236)	(0.028)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
Adjusted R^2					0.757	
Log Likelihood	−477.996	−418.580	−560.532	−741.845		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	983.993	865.159	1,149.064	1,511.691		
Residual Std. Error					1.104 (df = 2122)	
F Statistic					603.619*** (df = 11; 2122)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models. No fit statistics for model 6 as results are combined from multiple datasets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6 Conclusion

We have argued that peacekeeping operations under certain circumstances can produce assets with many of the characteristics of rent. While peacekeepers are in some ways providing aid to the host state, the sending states often receive a form of aid themselves in the form of increased experience for their soldiers as well as additional money, training and equipment. By increasing the soldiers' human capital as well as their salary, peacekeeping allows a regime to ensure its survival with loyal agents with increased capacity for repressive violence. And other states are incentivized to ignore human rights abuses given the interests served by these regimes' contribution to peacekeeping. Rwanda is an excellent example of the double-edged sword. It is clear that the external resources spent on the military have created a well-trained, multiethnic force. The Rwandan military also plays an intimate role in the national economy and its politics (Kuehnel and Wilén, 2017), including pro-regime violence (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

The paper illustrates these mechanisms with the violent but apparently stable equilibrium in Burundi. Using data on all peacekeeper commitments since 1990, we tested this hypothesis statistically. We discovered a significant, substantially important, association between peacekeeper commitments and destabilizing events carried out by the military.

Given trends in this demand, this problem will grow more pressing. One estimate is that there are at most 210,000 soldiers available for peacekeeping deployment, but demand is rising (Daniel, 2013). This suggest that potential rents available to providers will continue to grow. If there was ever a liberalizing effect of the UN's financial power Lundgren (2018), it is long gone. While Coleman and Nyblade (2018) argue that the "profit margin" is shrinking, this may only be true in a narrow sense. The combination of patronage and military human capital may still make peacekeeping attractive for survival-seeking regimes.

Our findings should be considered in tandem with the growing scholarly and policy recognition that military assistance is not a universal good in under-institutionalized states. A recent RAND study focusing on Africa observes that "weak and autocratic states have diffi-

culty making positive use of security sector assistance and in many studies, such assistance was found to have potentially destabilizing effects." Just because the assistance is derived from something as normatively attractive as peacekeeping does not remove these forces.

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7 Appendix

8 Robustness

As a robustness check, we used an alternative operationalization of our independent variable, all peacekeeper committments and then looking at the average number of peacekeepers committed over a 12 month period. Again we used soldier months commitments. The results show a significant correlation in the same direction as the primary models (See Tables 2 and 3).

We try to account for unit heterogeneity using a variety of different specifications. First, for the military atrocities variable, we ran conditional logit models. The results show a significant increased probability of a destabilizing event and the ICEWS variable associated with peacekeeping commitments (see table 4.). However, the results for military atrocities and Phoenix were insignificant.

Perhaps more violent peacekeeper missions shape returning soldiers' behavior. We account for this with models including variables measuring the degree of violence. We used the number of peacekeeper deaths from that country as a proportion of their overall deployment. The results remain substantively similar to the previous models, statistically significant, and in the predicted direction (Table 5).

While our theory implies a continuous functional form for our independent variable, we also substituted in a logged version of peacekeeper commitments (adding a small constant to zero values). The results here are a little more mixed. We find significant relationships between the logged peacekeeper months and Destablizing Events, Phoenix, and ICEWS. There is an insignificant relationship between logged peacekeeper months and CIRI, but they are not far from significant at the 10% level (p=.10) and Fariss(p=.11). The relationship between Military Atrocity and logged peacekeeper months changes sign but is insignificant (p=.58).

We then ran a variety of different specifications and the main results remained significant

at traditional levels. When we subset the sample to only countries that have committed peacekeepers in the previous year, our independent variable remains significant. Some studies have found that countries commit troops to prevent spillover effects of conflict. To ensure our results are not being driven by commitments into nearby conflict areas and violence is simply "spilling over" the border, we reran the models including a dummy variable measuring if peacekeeper commitments were being made in the a neighboring country.[12] The peacekeeper months variable remains significant with this variable included. The effects of peacekeeeping on domestic politics in the TCC may be conditional on the characteristics of missions. To address this, we ran the models again including mission dummies. This should account for mission specific effects. With these dummy variables included, our independent variables remain significant.

We used a subset of the data including only developing countries. Using the full sample of countries is a conservative approach as we include many countries who are both large contributors to peacekeeping and established democracy with low probabilities of repression. However, our theoretical predictions might more accurately apply to the population of developing countries. Our hypothesis continues to receive support.

We also ran count models for our dependent variables constructed from event data. For these variables instead of coding a 1 if there was any event for that year, we simply took the count for that year. We find that there is a positive significant relationship for all the count dependent variables.

[12]This was measured using the R cshapes package.

- Table 2: Dependent Variables
- Table 3: Use all peacekeeping months as independent variables
- Table 4: Independent variable logged
- Table 5: Average peacekeeping contribution as independent variables
- Table 6: Conditional logit models
- Table 7: Contributing Countries Only
- Table 8: Controls for violent missions
- Table 9: Mission Dummies
- Table 10: Neighboring Missions
- Table 11: Only developing countries
- Table 12: Count Models (Negative Binomial)

Table 2: Dependent Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Destabilizing State Event	3,472	0.116	0.321	0	1
Military Atrocity	4,340	0.066	0.249	0	1
Phoenix	5,425	0.069	0.253	0	1
ICEWS	5,425	0.714	0.452	0	1
CIRI	3,688	4.904	2.313	0	8
Fariss	4,562	0.658	1.441	−2.703	4.705

Table 3: All peacekeeping months

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Total Peacekeeper Months	0.00004***	0.00001**	0.00001***	0.00004***	−0.00001***	−0.00000***
	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.142	−0.042	0.005	−0.007	0.036	0.004
	(0.237)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.064	−0.042	0.135	−0.087	0.056**	0.003
	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.027)	(0.003)
Growth	−0.012	−0.002	0.015	0.004	−0.007	0.0005
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.0002	−0.009*	0.001	0.003**	0.001*	−0.00002
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.012	−0.057***	−0.011	−0.018	0.016***	0.001**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years Since Last Coup	0.009	0.008	0.023***	−0.005	−0.004**	−0.001***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.254***	1.679***	2.016***	1.816***	−0.751***	−0.016*
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.188)	(0.370)	(0.078)	(0.009)
ELF	−0.125	0.597*	0.808**	0.109	0.033	−0.006
	(0.343)	(0.361)	(0.358)	(0.300)	(0.102)	(0.012)
UN Voting Ideal Point	−0.047	0.108	0.086	0.170	0.188***	0.007
	(0.151)	(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.044)	(0.005)
$CIRI_{t-1}$					0.697***	
					(0.016)	
$Fariss_{t-1}$						0.984***
						(0.004)
Constant	−0.994	−1.655*	−4.637***	5.320***	1.174***	0.022
	(0.813)	(0.884)	(0.992)	(0.796)	(0.236)	(0.028)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
R^2					0.758	
Adjusted R^2					0.757	
Log Likelihood	−477.246	−418.631	−559.819	−740.865		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	982.493	865.262	1,147.638	1,509.730		
Residual Std. Error					1.104 (df = 2122)	
F Statistic					604.163*** (df = 11; 2122)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Independent Variable logged

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Troop Months	0.070***	0.013	0.045**	0.062***	−0.010	−0.001
(logged)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Aid/GDP	0.166	−0.044	0.003	−0.010	0.036	0.004
	(0.234)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.090	−0.070	0.113	−0.097	0.059**	0.004
	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.093)	(0.080)	(0.027)	(0.003)
Growth	−0.009	0.0003	0.016	0.005	−0.008	0.0004
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.0003	−0.008*	0.001	0.003*	0.001*	−0.00002
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.013	−0.051***	−0.013	−0.019	0.015***	0.001**
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years since last coup	0.009	0.009*	0.023***	−0.004	−0.004**	−0.001***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.247***	1.701***	2.087***	1.860***	−0.755***	−0.017*
	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.191)	(0.370)	(0.079)	(0.009)
ELF	−0.052	0.662*	0.834**	0.082	0.019	−0.006
	(0.344)	(0.364)	(0.358)	(0.300)	(0.103)	(0.012)
UN voting ideal point	−0.017	0.086	0.077	0.117	0.190***	0.007
	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.044)	(0.005)
$CIRI_{t-1}$					0.704***	
					(0.016)	
$Fariss_{t-1}$						0.985***
						(0.004)
Constant	−0.848	−1.505*	−4.474***	5.303***	1.145***	0.023
	(0.814)	(0.876)	(0.989)	(0.793)	(0.237)	(0.028)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
R^2					0.757	
Adjusted R^2					0.756	
Log Likelihood	−485.016	−421.910	−562.930	−742.285		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	998.032	871.819	1,153.859	1,512.571		
Residual Std. Error					1.106 (df = 2122)	
F Statistic					600.753*** (df = 11; 2122)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: 12 month average of peacekeeping contributions used as independent variable

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Months (average)	0.0004***	0.0001**	0.0001***	0.0004***	−0.0001***	−0.00001***
	(0.0001)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.0001)	(0.00002)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.164	−0.041	0.006	−0.005	0.035	0.004
	(0.225)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.071	−0.046	0.129	−0.089	0.056**	0.004
	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.093)	(0.080)	(0.027)	(0.003)
Growth	−0.011	−0.002	0.016	0.004	−0.007	0.0004
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.0004	−0.009*	0.001	0.003**	0.001*	−0.00002
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.012	−0.057***	−0.011	−0.018	0.016***	0.001**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years Since Last Coup	0.009*	0.008	0.023***	−0.004	−0.004**	−0.001***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.247***	1.678***	2.017***	1.816***	−0.747***	−0.016*
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.187)	(0.370)	(0.078)	(0.009)
ELF	−0.114	0.619*	0.831**	0.111	0.030	−0.006
	(0.343)	(0.361)	(0.357)	(0.300)	(0.102)	(0.012)
UN Voting Ideal Point	−0.042	0.111	0.093	0.171	0.186***	0.007
	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.044)	(0.005)
CIRI_{t-1}					0.698***	
					(0.016)	
Fariss_{t-1}						0.984***
						(0.004)
Constant	−0.955	−1.638*	−4.549***	5.339***	1.165***	0.021
	(0.810)	(0.883)	(0.987)	(0.796)	(0.236)	(0.028)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
R^2					0.758	
Adjusted R^2					0.757	
Log Likelihood	−478.680	−419.294	−561.101	−741.906		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	985.361	866.587	1,150.201	1,511.812		
Residual Std. Error					1.104 (df = 2122)	
F Statistic					603.700*** (df = 11; 2122)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Conditional logit

	Dependent variable:			
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Peacekeeper Months	0.00002*	−0.00000	0.00001	0.00004**
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)
Aid/GDP	2.324	−0.039	−0.179	−0.020
	(490.385)	(0.103)	(0.128)	(0.062)
GDP per capita	−0.751	−2.097**	−0.507	0.356
	(0.770)	(0.922)	(0.593)	(0.698)
Growth	−0.023	0.005	−0.020	−0.021
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Military Spending	−0.006	0.039**	0.004	0.012***
Per Soldier	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Polity	−0.008	−0.117***	−0.036	−0.043
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Years Since Last Coup	0.028	−0.025	0.019	−0.028
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Civil War	0.614**	0.984***	0.445	−0.039
	(0.311)	(0.344)	(0.298)	(0.519)
UN Voting Ideal Point	−0.238	0.795	−0.388	0.622
	(0.461)	(0.512)	(0.454)	(0.384)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387
R^2	0.025	0.021	0.008	0.017
Max. Possible R^2	0.323	0.239	0.258	0.344
Log Likelihood	−281.682	−248.775	−346.929	−482.507
Wald Test (df = 12)	15.000	36.650***	18.250	37.920***
LR Test (df = 12)	38.330***	42.978***	19.656*	40.000***
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 12)	39.339***	41.338***	18.993*	40.122***

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Only Troop Contributing Countries

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Troop Months	0.00004***	0.00001***	0.00001**	0.00003**	−0.00001***	−0.00000**
	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.282	−4.083	−0.067	0.003	0.029	0.003
	(0.325)	(255.577)	(0.101)	(0.067)	(0.025)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.245	0.172	0.060	−0.122	0.074**	0.007*
	(0.163)	(0.179)	(0.120)	(0.113)	(0.034)	(0.004)
Growth	−0.032	0.023	0.019	0.004	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.009***	−0.014	0.002*	0.003	0.0004	−0.0001
Per Soldier	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	0.003	−0.067***	−0.012	−0.014	0.020***	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.001)
Years since last coup	−0.003	−0.001	0.016***	−0.004	−0.002	−0.0003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	0.893***	1.537***	2.031***	1.235***	−0.635***	−0.007
	(0.264)	(0.257)	(0.220)	(0.431)	(0.092)	(0.011)
ELF	−0.704	1.235**	0.590	0.202	0.116	0.002
	(0.554)	(0.563)	(0.438)	(0.406)	(0.120)	(0.014)
UN voting ideal point	−0.771***	−0.150	−0.067	0.080	0.177***	0.004
	(0.253)	(0.267)	(0.168)	(0.179)	(0.053)	(0.006)
CIRI_{t-1}					0.724***	
					(0.018)	
Fariss_{t-1}						0.987***
						(0.004)
Constant	0.771	−3.734**	−3.247**	5.747***	0.745**	−0.016
	(1.483)	(1.514)	(1.296)	(1.171)	(0.305)	(0.036)
Observations	938	1,420	1,626	1,626	1,440	1,626
R^2					0.797	
Adjusted R^2					0.795	
Log Likelihood	−285.063	−248.827	−398.002	−474.357		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	598.126	525.654	824.004	976.714		
Residual Std. Error					1.009 (df = 1428)	
F Statistic					509.080*** (df = 11; 1428)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Mission Dummies included

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Troop Months	0.00004***	0.00002*	0.00001	0.0001***		−0.00000***
	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)		(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.022	−0.047	−0.023	−0.022	0.035	0.002
	(0.314)	(0.108)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.025)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.115	−0.186	0.158	−0.086	0.047*	0.005
	(0.110)	(0.134)	(0.108)	(0.089)	(0.029)	(0.004)
Growth	−0.011	−0.005	0.006	0.003	−0.004	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.001	−0.008	0.002	0.004**	0.001	−0.00003
Per Soldier	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0005)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.009	−0.039*	−0.011	−0.025	0.016***	0.001**
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years since last coup	0.016**	0.021***	0.025***	−0.003	−0.006***	−0.001***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.540***	1.987***	2.000***	2.059***	−0.824***	−0.022**
	(0.219)	(0.240)	(0.216)	(0.391)	(0.081)	(0.010)
ELF	−0.075	0.656	0.862**	0.161	0.022	−0.007
	(0.393)	(0.421)	(0.422)	(0.342)	(0.111)	(0.013)
UN ideal Point	0.001	0.137	0.040	0.328*	0.174***	0.004
	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.143)	(0.172)	(0.048)	(0.006)
CIRI_{t-1}					0.673***	
					(0.017)	
Fariss_{t-1}						0.980***
						(0.004)
Constant	−1.260	−1.092	−5.119***	4.411***	1.406***	0.023
	(0.884)	(0.993)	(1.159)	(0.867)	(0.247)	(0.029)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
R^2					0.766	
Adjusted R^2					0.757	
Log Likelihood	−431.719	−366.287	−487.218	−651.667		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,013.439	894.573	1,150.436	1,479.335		
Residual Std. Error					1.103 (df = 2050)	
F Statistic					81.020*** (df = 83; 2050)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Deadly Mission variable included

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
tmlag	0.00004^{***}	0.00001^{***}	0.00001^{***}	0.00003^{**}	-0.00001^{***}	-0.00000^{**}
	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.141	−0.043	0.005	−0.004	0.040^{*}	0.003
	(0.237)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.064	−0.040	0.135	−0.090	0.050^{*}	0.004
	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.027)	(0.003)
Growth	−0.012	−0.003	0.015	0.003	−0.007	0.0005
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.0002	-0.009^{*}	0.001	0.003^{**}	0.0005	−0.00002
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.012	-0.056^{***}	−0.012	−0.018	0.016^{***}	0.001^{**}
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years since last coup	0.009	0.008	0.023^{***}	−0.005	-0.004^{***}	-0.001^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.250^{***}	1.671^{***}	2.017^{***}	1.836^{***}	-0.750^{***}	-0.015^{*}
	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.189)	(0.370)	(0.078)	(0.009)
elf	−0.121	0.611^{*}	0.807^{**}	0.058	0.032	−0.004
	(0.344)	(0.362)	(0.358)	(0.301)	(0.102)	(0.012)
UN voting ideal point	−0.047	0.109	0.086	0.139	0.166^{***}	0.007
	(0.151)	(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.135)	(0.045)	(0.005)
Deadly Missions	−0.154	−0.831	0.106	2.430^{*}		−0.063
	(1.054)	(1.550)	(1.084)	(1.331)		(0.039)
CIRI_{t-1}					0.694^{***}	
					(0.016)	
Fariss_{t-1}						0.985^{***}
						(0.004)
Constant	−0.992	-1.652^{*}	-4.643^{***}	5.294^{***}	1.222^{***}	0.022
	(0.813)	(0.884)	(0.995)	(0.794)	(0.237)	(0.028)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
R^2					0.759	
Adjusted R^2					0.757	
Log Likelihood	−477.235	−418.472	−559.814	−738.806		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	984.471	866.943	1,149.628	1,507.612		
Residual Std. Error					1.102 (df = 2121)	
F Statistic					555.738^{***} (df = 12; 2121)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Mission in neigbhoring country dummy included

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Troop Months	0.00004^{***}	0.00001^{*}	0.00001^{***}	0.00004^{***}	-0.00001^{***}	-0.00000^{***}
	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.150	−0.031	0.014	−0.004	0.034	0.004
	(0.240)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	−0.078	−0.101	0.120	−0.069	0.053^{*}	0.003
	(0.099)	(0.115)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.027)	(0.003)
Growth	−0.012	−0.001	0.015	0.003	−0.007	0.0005
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Military Spending	0.001	−0.007	0.001	0.004^{**}	0.001	−0.00002
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Polity	−0.007	-0.047^{**}	−0.002	−0.017	0.015^{***}	0.001^{**}
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Years Since Last Coup	0.008	0.008	0.023^{***}	−0.006	-0.003^{**}	-0.0005^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.213^{***}	1.621^{***}	1.906^{***}	1.786^{***}	-0.743^{***}	-0.016^{*}
	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.191)	(0.370)	(0.079)	(0.009)
ELF	−0.060	0.678^{*}	0.989^{***}	0.227	0.004	−0.007
	(0.346)	(0.361)	(0.366)	(0.308)	(0.104)	(0.012)
UN Voting Ideal Point	−0.083	0.026	0.039	0.170	0.193^{***}	0.007
	(0.151)	(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.136)	(0.044)	(0.005)
Neighboring Mission	0.328	0.606^{***}	0.573^{***}	0.403^{*}	−0.107	−0.006
	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.210)	(0.232)	(0.071)	(0.009)
CIRI_{t-1}					0.696^{***}	
					(0.016)	
Fariss_{t-1}						0.984^{***}
						(0.004)
Constant	−0.974	−1.436	-4.793^{***}	5.110^{***}	1.228^{***}	0.024
	(0.812)	(0.886)	(0.997)	(0.802)	(0.239)	(0.028)
Observations	1,545	1,981	2,387	2,387	2,134	2,387
R^2					0.758	
Adjusted R^2					0.757	
Log Likelihood	−476.244	−415.215	−556.282	−739.265		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	982.488	860.429	1,142.565	1,508.531		
Residual Std. Error					1.103 (df = 2121)	
F Statistic					554.337^{***} (df = 12; 2121)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Excluding high income countries

	Dependent variable:					
	Destabilizing State Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS	CIRI	Fariss
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Peacekeeper Troop Months	0.00004***	0.00001***	0.00001***	0.00004***	−0.00001***	−0.00000***
	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00002)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP		−0.034	0.012	−0.083	0.065	0.009**
		(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.078)	(0.041)	(0.004)
GDP per capita	0.083	−0.095	0.237*	0.103	−0.012	−0.002
	(0.120)	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.120)	(0.042)	(0.005)
Growth	−0.024	−0.005	0.014	0.007	−0.007	0.001*
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.001)
Military Spending Per Soldier	−0.010	0.004	0.016*	0.021*	−0.007**	0.00001
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.0004)
Polity	0.019	−0.032	0.011	−0.028	0.025***	0.002**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Years since last coup	0.001	0.0003	0.016***	−0.006	−0.004**	−0.0004*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Civil War	1.022***	1.327***	1.575***	1.740***	−0.744***	−0.010
	(0.207)	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.376)	(0.091)	(0.011)
elf	−0.372	0.305	0.901**	0.191	0.134	0.007
	(0.363)	(0.359)	(0.404)	(0.353)	(0.123)	(0.015)
UN voting ideal point	−0.811***	−0.551**	−0.327	0.095	0.197***	0.020**
	(0.260)	(0.243)	(0.231)	(0.207)	(0.075)	(0.009)
$CIRI_{t-1}$					0.659***	
					(0.020)	
$Fariss_{t-1}$						0.978***
						(0.005)
Constant	−2.040**	−1.410	−5.152***	3.119***	1.835***	0.055
	(0.907)	(0.941)	(1.208)	(1.191)	(0.333)	(0.037)
Observations	1,055	1,344	1,625	1,625	1,440	1,625
R^2					0.674	
Adjusted R^2					0.671	
Log Likelihood	−376.632	−386.685	−395.398	−474.619		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	779.265	801.371	818.796	977.239		
Residual Std. Error					1.173 (df = 1428)	
F Statistic					268.186*** (df = 11; 1428)	

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Count data (Negative Binomial)

	Dependent variable:			
	Destabilizing Event	Military Atrocity	Phoenix	ICEWS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Peacekeeper Troop Months	0.0001***	0.00003***	0.00002***	0.00003***
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Aid/GDP	0.045	−0.093	0.006	−0.074***
	(0.268)	(0.102)	(0.064)	(0.024)
GDP per capita	−0.085	0.141	0.229**	0.202***
	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.093)	(0.034)
Growth	0.003	−0.022	0.012	−0.009
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.007)
Military Spending	−0.001	−0.011***	0.0002	0.0004
Per Soldier	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Polity	−0.053***	−0.015	−0.020	0.023***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Years since last coup	−0.003	−0.005	0.014***	0.009***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Civil War	1.937***	2.316***	2.413***	2.226***
	(0.210)	(0.220)	(0.187)	(0.078)
elf	0.019	−0.702*	0.302	0.222*
	(0.392)	(0.413)	(0.349)	(0.125)
UN voting ideal point	0.158	−0.414**	0.035	−0.613***
	(0.168)	(0.178)	(0.131)	(0.054)
Constant	−0.991	−2.616***	−5.457***	0.581**
	(0.904)	(0.954)	(0.820)	(0.294)
Observations	1,545	2,387	2,387	1,697
Log Likelihood	−928.924	−925.688	−862.561	−7,433.223
θ	0.131*** (0.014)	0.069*** (0.008)	0.196*** (0.028)	0.658*** (0.020)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,879.849	1,873.377	1,747.123	14,888.440

Cubic time trend from year of last event included but not reported in all logit models *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01